- Jul 10, 2003
- 27,776
I can't believe Newhaven and Portsmouth were on there. Surely the Russians weren't trying to improve Britain ?
Got something to say or just want fewer pesky ads? Join us... 😊
The Theat of Nuclear Annihilation in 1980s Britain
- Thread starter Flex Your Head
- Start date
I can't believe Newhaven and Portsmouth were on there. Surely the Russians weren't trying to improve Britain ?
Brian Parsons
New member
I agree with the posters who say the 60/70's were the time that nuclear war was likely. I was serving in the RAF at the time and we were often updated on the procedures needed in the aftermath of an attack. In 1965 it was estimated that Gamma radiation would last for at least 50yrs, so chances of anyone surviving were basically NIL. When I left the RAF that time span had risen to in excess of 200yrs. I think at that point most nuclear powers realised that nuclear war was in fact futile, no point in razing a country if you can't live in it after the war! But there are still crackpot national leaders out there with nuclear capacity so all is not well with the world!
somerset
New member
It wasn't however an incident that created a nuclear escalation though was it, it was an incident that led to a lot of hand wringing, much like many incidents of the era....the OP was talking about the threat of nuclear war, the real threat not perceived,.... hence the 60's win hands down......and I was an adult, not a schoolboy in the early 80's, so my attention to the detail of the news and its potential affects was fairly comprehensive I would say.
- Jul 10, 2003
- 27,776
I have to say that throughout the whole period, cock-up worried me as much as escalation. I suspect that these incidents we currently know about represent a small percentage of the number over the years on both sides. The fact that we survived 30 years of paranoia between the major powers, all having the ability to set something off accidentally is a minor miracle.
Last edited:
DumLum
Well-known member
Fair enough.
I will add this to the list of things I have been told were better in the 60s by those older than myself:
Football was better.
Music was better.
Food was better.
The threat of nuclear war was better.
daveinprague
New member
Thats what I find so frightening about the 1979 incident. We could have been gone, without any warning.
seagullsovergrimsby
#cpfctinpotclub
Maggie's final solution to ending the miners strike
DumLum
Well-known member
Watford Zero:I can't believe Newhaven and Portsmouth were on there. Surely the Russians weren't trying to improve Britain ?
Seagullsovergrimsby:Maggie's final solution to ending the miners strike?
Seagullsovergrimsby:Maggie's final solution to ending the miners strike?
seagullsovergrimsby
#cpfctinpotclub
In a MAD (mutually agreed destruction) scenario you had to use all of the complete nuclear arsenal because you wouldn't be able to use it again.
somerset
New member
Maggie's final solution to ending the miners strike
Interestingly, most of the Notts miners didn't strike.
KZNSeagull
Well-known member
These were the two stories I saw recently:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24280831
Thirty years ago, on 26 September 1983, the world was saved from potential nuclear disaster.
In the early hours of the morning, the Soviet Union's early-warning systems detected an incoming missile strike from the United States. Computer readouts suggested several missiles had been launched. The protocol for the Soviet military would have been to retaliate with a nuclear attack of its own.
But duty officer Stanislav Petrov - whose job it was to register apparent enemy missile launches - decided not to report them to his superiors, and instead dismissed them as a false alarm.
This was a breach of his instructions, a dereliction of duty. The safe thing to do would have been to pass the responsibility on, to refer up.
But his decision may have saved the world.
Continue reading the main story[h=2]“Start Quote[/h]
"I had all the data [to suggest there was an ongoing missile attack]. If I had sent my report up the chain of command, nobody would have said a word against it," he told the BBC's Russian Service 30 years after that overnight shift.
Mr Petrov - who retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel and now lives in a small town near Moscow - was part of a well-trained team which served at one of the Soviet Union's early warning bases, not far from Moscow. His training was rigorous, his instructions very clear.
'Couldn't move'His job was to register any missile strikes and to report them to the Soviet military and political leadership. In the political climate of 1983, a retaliatory strike would have been almost certain.
And yet, when the moment came, he says he almost froze in place.
"The siren howled, but I just sat there for a few seconds, staring at the big, back-lit, red screen with the word 'launch' on it," he says.
The system was telling him that the level of reliability of that alert was "highest". There could be no doubt. America had launched a missile.
"A minute later the siren went off again. The second missile was launched. Then the third, and the fourth, and the fifth. Computers changed their alerts from 'launch' to 'missile strike'," he says.
Mr Petrov smokes cheap Russian cigarettes as he relates the incidents he must have played over countless times in his mind.
"There was no rule about how long we were allowed to think before we reported a strike. But we knew that every second of procrastination took away valuable time; that the Soviet Union's military and political leadership needed to be informed without delay.
"All I had to do was to reach for the phone; to raise the direct line to our top commanders - but I couldn't move. I felt like I was sitting on a hot frying pan," he told us.
Although the nature of the alert seemed to be abundantly clear, Mr Petrov had some doubts.
Alongside IT specialists, like him, Soviet Union had other experts, also watching America's missile forces. A group of satellite radar operators told him they had registered no missiles.
But those people were only a support service. The protocol said, very clearly, that the decision had to be based on computer readouts. And that decision rested with him, the duty officer.
But what made him suspicious was just how strong and clear that alert was.
"There were 28 or 29 security levels. After the target was identified, it had to pass all of those 'checkpoints'. I was not quite sure it was possible, under those circumstances," says the retired officer.
Mr Petrov called the duty officer in the Soviet army's headquarters and reported a system malfunction.
If he was wrong, the first nuclear explosions would have happened minutes later.
"Twenty-three minutes later I realised that nothing had happened. If there had been a real strike, then I would already know about it. It was such a relief," he says with a smile.
'Lucky it was me'Now, 30 years on, Mr Petrov thinks the odds were 50-50. He admits he was never absolutely sure that the alert was a false one.
He says he was the only officer in his team who had received a civilian education. "My colleagues were all professional soldiers, they were taught to give and obey orders," he told us.
So, he believes, if somebody else had been on shift, the alarm would have been raised.
A few days later Mr Petrov received an official reprimand for what happened that night. Not for what he did, but for mistakes in the logbook.
He kept silent for 10 years. "I thought it was shameful for the Soviet army that our system failed in this way," he says.
But, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the story did get into the press. Mr Petrov received several international awards.
But he does not think of himself as a hero.
"That was my job", he says. "But they were lucky it was me on shift that night."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24183879
A four-megaton nuclear bomb was one switch away from exploding over the US in 1961, a newly declassified US document confirms.
Two bombs were on board a B-52 plane that went into an uncontrolled spin over North Carolina - both bombs fell and one began the detonation process.
The document was first published in the UK's Guardian newspaper.
The US government has acknowledged the accident before, but never made public how close the bomb came to detonating.
The document was obtained by journalist Eric Schlosser under the Freedom of Information Act.
Schlosser told the BBC such an explosion would have "changed literally the course of history".
The plane was on a routine flight when it began to break up over North Carolina on 23 January 1961.
As it was breaking apart, a control inside the cockpit released the two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs over Goldsboro.
One fell to the ground unarmed. But the second "assumed it was being deliberately released over an enemy target - and went through all its arming mechanisms save one, and very nearly detonated over North Carolina," Mr Schlosser told the BBC's Katty Kay.
Only one safety mechanism, a single low-voltage switch, prevented disaster, he said.
The bomb was almost 260 times more powerful than the bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The accident occurred during the height of the Cold War between US and Russia, just over a year before the Cuban missile crisis brought nuclear fears to the US's front door.
There has been ongoing speculation ever since, including a 1961 book by former government scientist Dr Ralph Lapp.
The newly declassified document was written eight years after the incident by US government scientist Parker Jones - who was responsible for mechanical safety of nuclear devices.
In it, he comments on and corrects Lapp's narrative of the accident, including listing that three out of the four fail safe mechanisms failed, not five out of six as originally thought by Lapp.
"One set off by the fall. Two rendered ineffective by aircraft breakup," Mr Jones writes. "It would have been bad news in spades."
"One simple dynamo-technology low voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe."
There has been no official comment to the newly declassified details.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24280831
Thirty years ago, on 26 September 1983, the world was saved from potential nuclear disaster.
In the early hours of the morning, the Soviet Union's early-warning systems detected an incoming missile strike from the United States. Computer readouts suggested several missiles had been launched. The protocol for the Soviet military would have been to retaliate with a nuclear attack of its own.
But duty officer Stanislav Petrov - whose job it was to register apparent enemy missile launches - decided not to report them to his superiors, and instead dismissed them as a false alarm.
This was a breach of his instructions, a dereliction of duty. The safe thing to do would have been to pass the responsibility on, to refer up.
But his decision may have saved the world.
Continue reading the main story[h=2]“Start Quote[/h]
There was no rule about how long we were allowed to think before we reported a strike. But we knew that every second of procrastination took away valuable time”
Stanislav Petrov
"I had all the data [to suggest there was an ongoing missile attack]. If I had sent my report up the chain of command, nobody would have said a word against it," he told the BBC's Russian Service 30 years after that overnight shift.
Mr Petrov - who retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel and now lives in a small town near Moscow - was part of a well-trained team which served at one of the Soviet Union's early warning bases, not far from Moscow. His training was rigorous, his instructions very clear.
'Couldn't move'His job was to register any missile strikes and to report them to the Soviet military and political leadership. In the political climate of 1983, a retaliatory strike would have been almost certain.
And yet, when the moment came, he says he almost froze in place.
"The siren howled, but I just sat there for a few seconds, staring at the big, back-lit, red screen with the word 'launch' on it," he says.
The system was telling him that the level of reliability of that alert was "highest". There could be no doubt. America had launched a missile.
"A minute later the siren went off again. The second missile was launched. Then the third, and the fourth, and the fifth. Computers changed their alerts from 'launch' to 'missile strike'," he says.
Mr Petrov smokes cheap Russian cigarettes as he relates the incidents he must have played over countless times in his mind.
"There was no rule about how long we were allowed to think before we reported a strike. But we knew that every second of procrastination took away valuable time; that the Soviet Union's military and political leadership needed to be informed without delay.
"All I had to do was to reach for the phone; to raise the direct line to our top commanders - but I couldn't move. I felt like I was sitting on a hot frying pan," he told us.
Although the nature of the alert seemed to be abundantly clear, Mr Petrov had some doubts.
Alongside IT specialists, like him, Soviet Union had other experts, also watching America's missile forces. A group of satellite radar operators told him they had registered no missiles.
But those people were only a support service. The protocol said, very clearly, that the decision had to be based on computer readouts. And that decision rested with him, the duty officer.
But what made him suspicious was just how strong and clear that alert was.
"There were 28 or 29 security levels. After the target was identified, it had to pass all of those 'checkpoints'. I was not quite sure it was possible, under those circumstances," says the retired officer.
Mr Petrov called the duty officer in the Soviet army's headquarters and reported a system malfunction.
If he was wrong, the first nuclear explosions would have happened minutes later.
"Twenty-three minutes later I realised that nothing had happened. If there had been a real strike, then I would already know about it. It was such a relief," he says with a smile.
'Lucky it was me'Now, 30 years on, Mr Petrov thinks the odds were 50-50. He admits he was never absolutely sure that the alert was a false one.
He says he was the only officer in his team who had received a civilian education. "My colleagues were all professional soldiers, they were taught to give and obey orders," he told us.
So, he believes, if somebody else had been on shift, the alarm would have been raised.
A few days later Mr Petrov received an official reprimand for what happened that night. Not for what he did, but for mistakes in the logbook.
He kept silent for 10 years. "I thought it was shameful for the Soviet army that our system failed in this way," he says.
But, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the story did get into the press. Mr Petrov received several international awards.
But he does not think of himself as a hero.
"That was my job", he says. "But they were lucky it was me on shift that night."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24183879
A four-megaton nuclear bomb was one switch away from exploding over the US in 1961, a newly declassified US document confirms.
Two bombs were on board a B-52 plane that went into an uncontrolled spin over North Carolina - both bombs fell and one began the detonation process.
The document was first published in the UK's Guardian newspaper.
The US government has acknowledged the accident before, but never made public how close the bomb came to detonating.
The document was obtained by journalist Eric Schlosser under the Freedom of Information Act.
Schlosser told the BBC such an explosion would have "changed literally the course of history".
The plane was on a routine flight when it began to break up over North Carolina on 23 January 1961.
As it was breaking apart, a control inside the cockpit released the two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs over Goldsboro.
One fell to the ground unarmed. But the second "assumed it was being deliberately released over an enemy target - and went through all its arming mechanisms save one, and very nearly detonated over North Carolina," Mr Schlosser told the BBC's Katty Kay.
Only one safety mechanism, a single low-voltage switch, prevented disaster, he said.
The bomb was almost 260 times more powerful than the bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The accident occurred during the height of the Cold War between US and Russia, just over a year before the Cuban missile crisis brought nuclear fears to the US's front door.
There has been ongoing speculation ever since, including a 1961 book by former government scientist Dr Ralph Lapp.
The newly declassified document was written eight years after the incident by US government scientist Parker Jones - who was responsible for mechanical safety of nuclear devices.
In it, he comments on and corrects Lapp's narrative of the accident, including listing that three out of the four fail safe mechanisms failed, not five out of six as originally thought by Lapp.
"One set off by the fall. Two rendered ineffective by aircraft breakup," Mr Jones writes. "It would have been bad news in spades."
"One simple dynamo-technology low voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe."
There has been no official comment to the newly declassified details.
seagullsovergrimsby
#cpfctinpotclub
Lenny Rider
Well-known member
- Sep 15, 2010
- 6,015
Quite the opposite with me, joined Worthing VI form in Sept straight from being cocooned in an all boys school, quickly aligned with the more reactionary students, all part of the excitement, joined CND went on the London march in Oct 1980 and later the Worthing CND march (yes we really had one) of May 1981.
Looking back I was at a very young age almost brainwashed by students and teachers alike from a left wing faction, in hindsight at that time nuclear weapons were essential to keeping this country safe, anyone who wanted them scrapped was either deluded or part of a communist cell.
Maggie got a few things wrong in her time but on this she was 100% in the right.
- Jul 10, 2003
- 27,776
I agree that one of us is deluded.
Lord Bracknell
On fire
Not quite so. The chances of surviving UNHARMED might be basically NIL. But the chances of living for quite a long time (indeed, many years) after a nuclear attack are quite high, provided you aren't killed by the blast effects (which are quite limited). Hence the need for the "civil defence" planning that I was involved with.
Lord Bracknell
On fire
There was an argument propounded at the time that claimed that preparations for dealing with a nuclear attack actually increased the chances of such an attack happening. If the nation thought it could survive an attack, maybe the "MAD" scenario - guaranteed destruction - wasn't valid?
I didn't realise I had such a radical effect on you Ian!
- Aug 7, 2003
- 8,090
Many nuclear bunkers were built in london in the 1980's costing billions in todays money. The threat was very real
[YT]6677Eppc-sk[/YT]
[YT]6677Eppc-sk[/YT]
Nibble
New member
- Jan 3, 2007
- 19,238
I was a wee pup when the 80's nuclear thang was going on so I don't really know how real the threat was but being about 5 or 6 a the time I still remember being terrified we were going to get the bomb dropped on us. My Mum belonged to some local council nuclear war training group of some description. I remember she used to attend it on a Wednesday evening. One Thursday I came down for breakfast and saw a Geiger counter thingy on the table. I remember getting really scared thinking the 4 min warning was imminent.
As I say, I'm not sure how real the threat was, but the paranoia levels at the time coupled with horrific programmes and films like When The Wind Blows had the little Nibster in quite the funkle.
As I say, I'm not sure how real the threat was, but the paranoia levels at the time coupled with horrific programmes and films like When The Wind Blows had the little Nibster in quite the funkle.